Arguing Idealisms: Epistemological
October 15, 2012 1 Comment
I have been having a whole bunch of fun thinking about idealism lately (and then immediately putting on my unoriginal theologian’s hat) [1]. Of course, there is a raft of meanings that people attach to the term idealist and obviously I can’t be meaning all meanings all the time, so I will only be speaking here about those that I find particularly compelling. First, there is epistemological idealism, a family of views [2] that concerns itself with the contents of experience and which asserts that we cannot know objects in a mind-independent way (how this washes out is somewhat different for each theorist). Then there is ontological idealism, which makes the much stronger assertion that reality is, in one way or another, at base fundamentally mental, not material. I am going to present, across an indeterminate number of posts, some arguments for each that I have cooked-up myself. I make no claim that these arguments are original to the history of philosophy – I wouldn’t know because during my undergraduate degree idealism wasn’t a big topic of discussion, due to too much worrying about free will in light of the obvious fact (?!) of causal determinism – but at least they are my own. On, then, to…
Epistemic Idealism:
Of the two, epistemological idealism (henceforth: EI) is by far the easier to argue for and is actually, I have found, a quite common, if very much implicitly held, belief among scientifically literate people (and others besides) [3]. To put my cards on the table, I take EI very seriously – I haven’t encountered an argument yet that seriously threatened idealist skepticism of knowledge about the external world. Although I may deal with such criticisms in some future post, at present I am interested in presenting my own reasons for accepting EI. As such, I present the following argument:
Say I have two apples (yum!) and I want to know what colour they are. No problem, I just look at them – “oh, one is red and one is green” – and that would count as sufficient evidence for most people that one of the apples is red and the other is green. They could repeat the experiment and confirm my results. If there was a large enough group of people, however, there would inevitably be a few colour blind people who would insist that “there are two green apples and what the heck is this ‘red’ thing you people are always on about?” They would be doing the same experiment and actually getting different results.
We cannot merely dismiss the colour blind as being wrong about the colour of the apples simply because there are fewer of them – after all, if we were in a hypothetical colour sighted minority we wouldn’t accept that red doesn’t exist simply because most everyone else couldn’t recognize it. So what becomes obvious is that we have a problem, which is that the apples seem to be differently coloured (red and green) only within certain frames of reference (i.e. those including organisms with perceptual apparati like that of colour sighted human beings), while they are identically coloured within other frames of reference (e.g. those of colour blind human beings). With this recognition it becomes easy to imagine further frames of reference in which the apples seem to be multi-coloured, or to have no colour at all, or even to be visually absent (e.g. worms don’t have eyes).
Still, the question stands: what colour(s) are the apples? What is obvious is that we cannot answer the question by piling up a list of the apples’ seemings-to-be across the complete set of possible and actual frames of reference for the apples. That such a piling-up of seemings will bring us closer to the facts of the matter is difficult to believe, particularly since in only a trivial number will they even have colour, let alone be red and/or green [4]. What we want to know is what colour the apples are independent of how they seem – that is, what colour are they from no frame of reference? Unfortunately, this is impossible to answer.
For example, we might try to resolve the issue by use of science. We know that our perceptual apparatus works in particular ways and acknowledges different colours in response to certain wavelengths of light reflected from the surface of objects, so we could simply measure the reflectivity properties of the apples. But if that is what we choose to do, although we would be learning something potentially interesting and useful about them, we nevertheless wouldn’t have ascertained what colour they are, merely something about their light-reflective properties. Or we could measure the wavelength of the light reflected from the apples, but again we will not have identified what colour the apples are. We could note what is going on in our nervous systems when the light reaches our eyes, but certainly whatever that research reveals would definitely not tell us anything about the apples!
This argument, while familiar to any who have spent much time learning about human perceptual systems, is still, however, one step away from full-blown EI. I will now take us the rest of the way.
In a deeper sense, the question of what colour the apples are is incoherent. Remembering that we cannot identify the colour(s) of the apples except from some frame of reference, for there to be the seeing of a red and a green apple requires the presence of both the apples and of a perceiver capable of the perception of red and green alike. I can see both colours but colour blind people can’t, even if we are looking at the same objects. The apples are able to cause different perceptions of colour in different organisms on the basis of those organisms’ perceptual faculties being of the sort that are capable, in conjunction with the right external causes, of producing ‘red’- and ‘green’-experiences. Were there no such organisms, there would be no such thing as experiences of ‘red’ or ‘green’. So to ask what colour the apples are from no frame of reference in particular is to ask what the non-experience of experiential qualities – as caused by some object(s) – must be like, which is an obvious non-starter.
The implication of this is that colour is not a property of the objects at all! Rather, colour is a perceptual experience that may be said to have been caused along the lines explained above, so the very most we could say about the apples is that they have the property of being the sort of things that can cause ‘red’- or ‘green’-experiences (under the right conditions). Now, the same holds true for all properties and all objects. A challenge for the reader: identify even a single property of some object that is not relative to some particular frame of reference. I believe that there is nothing – nothing – that may be posited as an observer-independent property of any perceived object whatsoever. In fact, we do no not perceive objects at all – there are only our perceptions. This is EI.
Endnotes:
[1] What can I say? I was always kind of weird – definitely never much of an outdoors kid (sorry, Dad).
[2] Just assume from here on that I am speaking about families of views. It’s too much work to provide an in-depth and subtle comparison between, say, Berkeley and Kant. In addition, I would have to understand Kant. Ha! :S
[3] Which brings me sharp jolts of Schadenfreude any time it becomes apparent. The irony of my sciencey friends making idealist arguments about perception when the very thought of idealism itself is repellent to them… it’s just too delicious.
[4] I suppose one could say that God could clear it up, that if any frame of reference is objective, it’s his. To which I would respond: “what, does God have eyes?”