Some More Words on Agnostic Atheism
May 1, 2012 6 Comments
I was having a conversation with an atheist friend of mine and he suggested (actually, ‘suggested’ is much too weak a description of what he did) that my agnostic atheism is hopelessly confused. He gave two somewhat related reasons that struck me as being worth addressing. The first is that, although he was willing to concede that atheism ought properly to be considered a belief claim, he nevertheless felt that one who believes that ‘there is no God’ necessarily cannot also believe that ‘whether or not there is a God is beyond our capacity to know’ – to do so is to somehow do something that is contradictory. The second reason was that the agnosticism takes away reasons for adopting the atheism.
The first is actually not that difficult a matter to address. Obviously, in one sense he was cutting himself off at the knees by granting that atheism ought to be considered a belief claim rather than a knowledge claim. If the one claim is that ‘I know x‘ and the other is that ‘I cannot know x‘, there is an obvious contradiction there. But there is nothing at all inherently contradictory if the first of the two statements were to be replaced with ‘I believe x‘. For example, suppose I believed that I will be receiving a pink slip today (perhaps the company is in some tough times and layoffs have been announced). This is in no way incompatible with my acknowledgement that I do not know whether or not I will actually receive a pink slip (maybe I sit somewhere in the middle of the seniority ladder and the management hasn’t announced how many they will be laying off). The same applies to agnostic atheism.
The second criticism is perhaps more damning. To take a stance on the question (whether that be some species of theism or atheism) is to make quite a strong commitment, even if that stance is ‘merely’ a matter of belief rather than knowledge. Given that this is so, wouldn’t it just be best to acknowledge that one cannot know and leave it at that? While it would certainly be a ‘safer’ position, I don’t think that it is a better one. While the epistemic requirements for knowledge (especially of this kind) are rather high (I am here assuming some JTB+), there are certainly reasons for deciding more or less tentatively in favour of one proposition over another. For example, I believe (rather strongly) that my house keys are where I left them when I got home yesterday. Of course, I do not ‘know’ this – perhaps my wife, for what would clearly be a good reason, had occasion to move them – but, nevertheless, I have some pretty good reasons for thinking so. The same can hold for theism or atheism. For example, I see Darwinian natural selection as an adequate explanation of apparent design, which makes a designer superfluous to the whole process, while a theist might point to what he sees as the unintelligibility of morality without a lawgiver as evidence in favour of God.
Of course, the coherence of my position really does depend on whether theism/atheism really are belief – but not knowledge – claims. I think so, but that is a matter for another day.